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Introduction
Economic models of worker behaviour typically assume that people dislike working. Hence, in order to induce workers to exert e¤ort, employers must provide external incentives. Employers have di¤erent means to increase workers' e¤ort. For instance, the introduction of pay-for-performance devices will induce employees to work harder. Equivalently, closer monitoring of workers'e¤ort, accompanied by sanctions (e.g. dismissal) in case of shirking, will also result in higher e¤ort.
Empirical research suggests that the standard neoclassical view of worker behaviour is often too narrow. Agell and Lundborg (1999) report results of a survey among managers in Swedish manufacturing and conclude that "much recent theorizing about e¤ort and incentives is potentially misplaced [because] most managers appear to ascribe a more important motivational role to psychological and sociological factors than to economic sticks and carrots" (p. 25) . Interviews with US managers by Bewley (1998) yield corresponding results. Rather than monetary incentives, managers emphasize that work should be interesting and stimulating, that workers should feel involved in decision-making, and that workers'achievements are noticed and appreciated. 1 One Swedish manager responded that "people work hard as long as they have fun".
Surveys among employees also indicate that monetary rewards are of much less importance for job satisfaction and workers'e¤ort than postulated in economic analysis. For instance, in a 1977 survey of the US labour force, half of the respondents agreed with the statement that "what I do at work is more important to me than the money I earn", and more than 90 percent stated that they put in more e¤ort into their job than required (Quinn and Staines, 1979) . Even though we should be cautious (or even suspicious) about stated preferences, the results of these surveys suggest that a large part of the labour force is motivated at work by more than just monetary rewards (Baron, 1988) .
The observation that workers may provide e¤ort for non-pecuniary reasons has two important implications. First, monetary incentive schemes designed to motivate a 'standard neoclassical worker' may be suboptimal. Second, when people di¤er in their motivation, the performance of a …rm may become dependent on its capability to select the 'most motivated'candidate among job applicants. This paper relaxes the standard assumption in the economic literature that people dislike working to study these issues. We develop a model in which workers to a certain extent like to exert e¤ort at the workplace. Hence, people like their job, not only because they get paid, but also because they enjoy working. Whereas this type of motivation has for long been virtually absent in mainstream economics, psychologists have argued that people undertake many activities without expecting an extrinsic reward. 'Intrinsic motivation' is considered to be of major importance for human behaviour (see e.g. DeCharms, 1968 , Deci, 1971 , and Furnham, 1990 .
Recently, a few papers in economics have studied wages and incentive schemes when workers are intrinsically motivated (Benabou and Tirole, 2003 , Besley and Ghatak, 2004 , Francois, 2000 , and Glazer, 2004 . The main distinguishing feature of our paper is that we allow workers' motivation to be private knowledge. As a result, the …rm can not select the best-motivated worker among the job applicants. Hence, an adverse selection problem arises. We show that it may be in the interest of the …rm to o¤er a low wage so as to discourage relatively low motivated workers from applying. This comes at the cost of a higher probability of leaving the vacancy un…lled. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-o¤ between the probability of …lling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected motivation of the selected worker.
People may be intrinsically motivated to work for di¤erent reasons. One might simply like to undertake certain activities. The activities which are intrinsically valued, and hence the evaluation of intrinsic qualities of di¤erent jobs, may vary across people. A motivated veterinary surgeon is not likely to be motivated to work as a butcher. Intrinsic motivation is not solely determined by persons, jobs, or …rms, but by combinations of certain people and certain jobs or …rms.
Intrinsic motivation may also be related to 'self-esteem', broadly de…ned as how people think about themselves. Thus, people may be intrinsically motivated to work (or to refrain from shirking), because it makes them think better about themselves. Self-esteem may be enhanced by working or refraining from shirking in general, but it may also be related to particular kind of jobs. For instance, workers in hospitals may feel that they contribute to a goal which is considered to be 'good'. Dixit (2002) notes that organisations that serve an idealistic or ethical purpose may be particularly attractive for people who share these goals. Obviously, which goals are considered to be 'good'may di¤er among individuals.
Regardless of the precise reason for the enjoyment of or satisfaction from work, the baseline is that people can derive utility from working. The presence of intrinsically motivated workers has important implications for …rms. Motivated people probably work harder, which increases output. And because people derive utility from the job, they may be willing to work for a lower wage. People will take job satisfaction into account when deciding on whether to accept or reject a wage o¤er. A higher wage at another job may not compensate for the loss of intrinsic qualities of the job. We develop a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a particular …rm. Working at the …rm has some unique trait which is valued di¤erently by di¤erent workers, giving the …rm monopsony power. 2 We study two issues. First, we examine the implications of workers'intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We extend a standard incentive wage model and show that -in line with Dixit -motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e¤ort, are willing to work for a lower wage. The higher the …rm's bargaining power, the more it can extract the motivational rents from the worker. When the …rm has su¢ cient bargaining power, a more motivated worker brings about higher output and, under a mild condition, lower wage cost. We also show that when the …rm has a decreasing returns to e¤ort production technology, monetary incentives are weaker, the more motivated its workers.
Second, we examine how the …rm can attract and select highly motivated workers to …ll a vacancy. We assume that each worker has positive probability of observing the vacancy. The workers who observe the vacancy decide whether or not to apply, taking application cost into account. We consider three cases which di¤er in the assumption made about the observability of applicants' motivation. We start with the assumption that the …rm can observe the motivation of applicants. Next, we consider the case where the …rm can not observe the motivation of the applicants. Lastly, we allow the applicants to credibly signal their motivation to the …rm.
We will show that in all of these cases, it is optimal for the …rm to commit to a minimum wage o¤er, either because commitment resolves the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971) or because it avoids a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970) . When motivation of applicants is observable to the …rm, the …rm hires the worker with the best motivation among those who applied. The pro…t-maximising level of the minimum wage is determined by the trade-o¤ between wage cost and the probability of …lling the vacancy. When motivation is unobservable, there is an additional selection e¤ect. A higher minimum wage decreases the expected quality of job applicants, as it induces less motivated workers to apply for the job. Hence, the probability that a highly motivated worker is selected decreases. However, if applicants can signal their motivation to the …rm, a commitment to a minimum wage gives them an incentive to reveal their motivation, which eliminates the selection e¤ect.
The di¤erent assumptions about the observability of applicants'motiva-tion may re ‡ect di¤erent screening technologies employed by …rms, ranging from application forms and job interviews to work trials and the use of assessment centres (see Keenan, 1995, and Bartram et al.) . The use of tests in the screening process has increased substantially over the last decades (Jenkins, 2001). The 'personality and workstyle questionnaire' has become one of the most widely used test types (Ryan et al., 1999) . While these …ndings may suggest that …rms have ample opportunities to determine applicants' motivation, the performance of applicants in such tests may be subject to their choice of e¤ort and behaviour, implying that applicants may have a choice whether or not to reveal their motivation to the …rm. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 examines the implications of workers'intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. In Section 4 we study how the …rm can attract and select highly motivated workers to …ll a vacancy, assuming that the …rm can only o¤er a …xed wage. Section 5 generalises the results of Section 4 to the case of optimal monetary incentive schemes, as studied in Section 3. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Intrinsic motivation has, until recently, been largely ignored in economic analysis, with the exception of the work by Bruno Frey (see among others Frey, 1993 Frey, , 1997a Frey, , and 1997b ). We di¤er from his work in our focus on sorting and selection issues. Moreover, we abstract from the possibility that external incentives crowd out a worker's intrinsic motivation. Therefore, in our model, it is always in the …rm's interest to provide monetary incentives, even when a worker is highly motivated. However, high wages reduce the average intrinsic motivation among the pool of job candidates, and may thus reduce labour productivity unless the …rm can fully observe applicants' intrinsic motivation.
The idea that, all else equal, workers are willing to work for a lower wage at jobs with intrinsic qualities traces back to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The theory of equalising di¤erences (Brown, 1980 , Rosen, 1986 states that all (dis)amenities of a job are re ‡ected in its wage. Several studies suggest that the opportunity to contribute to the goals of a non-pro…t organisation is valued by workers and may explain the wage di¤erential between non-pro…t and for-pro…t organisations (see e.g. Hansmann, 1980 , Preston, 1989 , Frank, 1996 , and Rose-Ackerman, 1996 . Recent empirical evidence is provided by Leete (2001) and Frey, Kucher, and Stutzer (2001) . This paper contributes to this literature by examining the e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on optimal pay-for-performance schemes and on recruitment and selection of job applicants.
Most of our analysis focuses on the case where workers' motivation is unobservable to the …rm. Hence, our model is a principal-agent model where the agent (the worker) has private information about his type. Benabou and Tirole, by contrast, focus on the case where the principal has private information about the attractiveness of the job to workers. The choice of the wage scheme by the principal may then signal his private knowledge to the worker. As a result, extrinsic rewards may either crowd in or crowd out intrinsic motivation. Several recent papers study incentive provision to intrinsically motivated workers, among others Besley and Ghatak, Francois, and Glazer. In these papers, as in ours, …rms have all the bargaining power. In contrast to our paper, these papers assume that the …rm can observe workers'intrinsic motivation. 3 Our analysis builds on signaling and screening models of the labour market. A seminal paper in this …eld is Spence (1973) , and a recent survey of the literature is Riley (2001) . Most studies focus on screening of workers' abilities. The setup of our model is closely related to the ability-models. As in our model, …rms must commit to pay high wages to induce workers to signal their type. An important di¤erence between the ability-models and our model is that motivation not only a¤ects worker's productivity, but also his willingness to work. Moreover, our model departs from the standard screening model by assuming that the …rm faces several job applicants, among which it chooses, as in Janssen (2002) . The standard model considers the case of one worker and two …rms, see Cho and Kreps (1987) .
Our work is also related to the job search literature, in particular to directed search models (see e.g. Burdett, Shi, and Wright, 2001, and Shi, 2002) . Montgomery (1991) argues that …rms that face high cost of leaving a vacancy un…lled o¤er higher wages. The reason is that workers send an application with higher probability to …rms that o¤er higher wages. Hence, …rms increase their probability of …lling the vacancy by posting a higher wage, as in our model. Another common element is that workers base their application decision on the probability of getting the job, which depends on the expected total number of applicants for this job.
Closest to our paper is Handy and Katz (1998) . They study a model in which potential employees di¤er in both ability and motivation. While the …rm can test for an applicant's ability, it can not distinguish motivated from unmotivated workers. Handy and Katz show that to promote self-selection among potential employees, the …rm has an incentive to commit itself to pay a low wage. By committing to pay a low wage, the …rm is certain that a job applicant is a motivated worker. Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in various respects. First, we assume that the …rm can not draw on an in…nitely large pool of applicants consisting of all types of workers. In our model, the …rm can not be certain that the worker who is most motivated for the job has observed the vacancy and, hence, is in the pool of job applicants. Therefore, a commitment to pay the lowest possible wage (the wage which is acceptable only to the most motivated worker in the economy) is in general not optimal for the …rm. For it precludes hiring a worker who is somewhat less motivated when the most motivated worker in the economy is not available. Hence, the …rm optimally sets a minimum wage which attracts workers with di¤erent -albeit high -levels of motivation to apply for the job. Second, Handy and Katz do not consider the decision of potential employees to apply for a job. We show that their results depend on the assumption that application costs are zero. Positive application costs, however small, imply that a maximum wage is of no avail, whereas a minimum wage helps to attract and select highly motivated workers. Application costs are likely to be positive, given the time and e¤ort involved in writing an application, having job interviews, and possibly performing tests, attending an assessment centre, or even undertaking a work trial. Lastly, our analysis allows for signaling by workers and o¤ering performance pay by …rms.
Optimal Monetary Incentive Schemes for Motivated Workers
This section explores the implications of workers' intrinsic motivation for the optimal design of monetary incentive schemes. The literature (see e.g. Lazear, 1995) usually assumes a worker's utility function of the form:
where utility is concave in income (U 1 > 0; U 11 < 0), income depends on e¤ort according to the wage scheme w(e), and the cost of exerting e¤ort is convex (U 2 < 0; U 22 < 0). We introduce intrinsic motivation by adding a third argument to the utility function: 4
where i 2 [0; ]. i measures the degree to which worker i is intrinsically motivated, which varies between di¤erent kind of jobs. The positive utility derived from e¤ort is assumed to be concave in e (U 3 > 0; U 33 < 0). 5 Hence, apart from an indirect e¤ect of e¤ort on income through the wage scheme, utility …rst increases in e¤ort and then, starting from some level depending 0 e U 1 = 0 2 > 1 3 > 2 Figure 1 : The e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on the direct utility of e¤ort on the value of i , starts decreasing, see Figure 1 . Depending on the level of e, total utility derived from exerting e¤ort may be positive or negative. For convenience, we assume that all cross-derivatives are zero:
The …rm's pro…t depends on the e¤ort of the worker:
Pro…t is the di¤erence between the value of the output generated by the e¤ort of the worker, q (e), and the wage cost. The production function has decreasing returns to worker's e¤ort, q 0 (e) > 0 and q 00 (e) < 0.
In this section, we assume that the …rm observes the worker's motivation and has all the bargaining power. The …rm sets wage cost as low as possible, but the wage must meet the worker's participation constraint:
where U out is the outside option of the worker. We assume that the worker's alternative to employment at this …rm is living on an unemployment bene…t b. More generally, the outside option of the worker would take into account expected job opportunities at other …rms. If other …rms would o¤er jobs with the same kind of intrinsic qualities, a worker's outside option would depend on his motivation. This would weaken our argument that motivated workers are willing to work for a lower wage. In a related paper, we analyse the e¤ects of competition in the labour market for intrinsically motivated workers (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2002) . There, we show that competition leads to higher wages, stronger incentives, and higher productivity. In this paper, we abstract from outside job opportunities. We thus focus on situations where the …rm has (su¢ cient) monopsonistic power, either because workers' intrinsic motivation is …rm-speci…c or because there are no other …rms (in the neighbourhood) o¤ering jobs with the same intrinsic qualities. The worker's optimal amount of e¤ort is found by maximising the utility function (1) to e:
In the optimum, the worker's (…nancial and motivational) marginal bene…ts of e¤ort equal the marginal cost of e¤ort. The …rm maximises pro…ts. Since the …rm has all the bargaining power, it sets the worker's total compensation such that it leaves no rents to the worker. Though the …rm does not directly control the worker's e¤ort e, it can design a monetary incentive scheme that induces the worker to exert the optimal level of e¤ort: 6
In the optimum, the marginal product equals marginal wage cost. First-order conditions (4) and (5) imply that if the …rm sets the wage scheme optimally, the worker's marginal utility of e¤ort, apart from the e¤ect of extra e¤ort on his income, is negative. Hence, people stating that they enjoy every aspect of their work ("my work is my hobby") are simply exerting too little e¤ort (or, in other words, their wage scheme is suboptimal). Note also that (4) and (5) imply that monetary incentives are stronger, the less motivated is the worker (i.e., w 0 (e) is larger, the lower i ). Important for this result is our assumption that q 00 (e) < 0. With constant returns to e¤ort [q 00 (e) = 0], the optimal reward per unit of e¤ort w 0 (e) equals the marginal product of e¤ort q 0 (e), which is constant when q 00 (e) = 0:
The …rm sets total compensation to the worker such that it leaves no rents to the worker. In the optimum, the …rm creates a compensation scheme which induces the worker to choose the level of e¤ort de…ned by (4) and (5) at the lowest cost to the …rm, implying that the worker ends up with a total utility of U = U out , de…ned by (3).
Intrinsic motivation has two important e¤ects. First, the higher , the higher the maximum wage the …rm is willing to o¤er. Stated di¤erently, given the level of the wage, it is more pro…table to the …rm to hire a worker who is more motivated. The maximum wage the …rm is willing to o¤er is the wage which would leave the …rm with zero pro…t:
6 When neither e¤ort nor production is veri…able, the …rm cannot induce workers to provide optimal e¤ort. We deal with this case at the end of this section.
Since marginal productivity q 0 (e) is positive, we have to show that e increases in . Applying the implicit function theorem to (4) results in:
where @ 2 U ( )=@e 2 < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker's optimisation problem (4) . E¤ort increases in a worker's motivation if U 3 > e U 33 . We assume that this condition holds: it is unlikely that a more motivated worker works less hard because he enjoys working already so much. More e¤ort implies more output. Hence, the maximum wage the …rm is willing to o¤er increases in the worker's motivation. Second, given the level of e¤ort, intrinsic motivation a¤ects the wage the …rm needs to o¤er to meet the worker's participation constraint. We show that for constant e =ê, the minimum wage for which the worker is willing to work decreases in . Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) results in:
The expression in (8) is always negative: Given the level of e¤ort, a worker who is more motivated for the job needs to be compensated less.
In general, the e¤ect of motivation on total wage compensation is ambiguous. A more motivated worker needs to be compensated less for each unit of e¤ort. However, he exerts more e¤ort than less motivated workers, implying that the total wage may be increasing in motivation. In appendix 1 we prove that dw(e) d < 0 if the following condition holds:
The right-hand side of this inequality denotes the net increase in disutility due to the higher level of e¤ort. The left-hand side is the increase in motivational utility derived from all e¤ort the worker exerts, because of the higher motivation. If, in the new optimum, the increased pleasure of working is higher than the burden of the additional e¤ort, highly motivated workers need less …nancial compensation than less motivated workers.
Higher motivation thus has two e¤ects: the …rm is willing to o¤er a higher wage, while, given the level of e¤ort, the worker is willing to accept a lower wage. Motivation therefore increases the joint surplus of the worker and the …rm. When the …rm has all the bargaining power, it can extract all rents from the motivation of the worker by adjusting the compensation scheme. This implies that, if condition (9) is satis…ed, more motivated workers will be o¤ered lower wages, even though they are more productive. 7 Hence, 7 Allowing for a more equal distribution of bargaining power between the …rm and the without a commitment of the …rm not to extract all motivational rents, job applicants may be reluctant to reveal their motivation to the …rm, or worse even, the …rm may not be able to attract any applicant at all. Section 4 addresses this problem.
Both e¤ects of intrinsic motivation are also present in the case of a …xed wage. When the …rm is unable or unwilling to use incentive wages, 8 the optimal level of e¤ort of the worker is given by (4) with w 0 (e) equal to zero. The e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on e¤ort is still given by (7) . E¤ort and thus output increase in the worker's motivation. This is also clear from Figure 1 : a worker's optimal e¤ort with a …xed wage is given by the top of the curve, which moves to the right, the higher is . Hence, the maximum …xed wage the …rm is willing to o¤er increases in the worker's motivation. Moreover, the minimum …xed wage a worker is willing to accept decreases in motivation. By using …rst-order condition (4), we can rewrite condition (9) to:
In case of a …xed wage, w 0 (e) = 0, condition (10) always holds. Therefore, the higher motivation, the higher the direct utility from e¤ort, and the lower the wage needs to be in order to meet the participation constraint of the worker.
Attracting and Selecting Motivated Workers
This section examines how a …rm can attract and select highly motivated workers to …ll a vacancy. We consider three cases: One where the …rm can observe the motivation of the applicants, one where it can not, and one where workers decide whether or not to signal their motivation. To focus on the distributional con ‡ict between the …rm and the worker, we abstract from monetary incentives and assume that the …rm o¤ers a base salary only. Allowing for monetary incentives does not a¤ect the results qualitatively, which we show in Section 5, but it distracts attention from our main results.
workers need not a¤ect this result. As long as the …rm has su¢ cient bargaining power, the wage of the worker decreases in motivation, provided that condition (9) holds. See Appendix 2. 8 One reason why …rms may refrain from providing monetary incentives to motivated workers is high monitoring cost, see Weiss (1990, pp. 73-76) . In case of multiple tasks, monetary incentives may crowd out facets of tasks which are hard to observe by facets of tasks which are more easily observed (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) . Alternatively, monetary incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, see Frey (1997a) and Benabou and Tirole.
Setup of the Model
A …rm has one vacancy, and posts a 'help-wanted' ad. As in the previous section, the …rm has all the bargaining power. However, we assume that the …rm can credibly commit to pay at least a certain wage by posting a base salary w min in the ad. Workers di¤er in their intrinsic motivation 2 [0; ] to work at this …rm, while their outside options are identical, U out . There is a discrete number of worker types in the economy, with n i workers of type i . Denote by N i the total number of workers with motivation equal to or higher than i :
Each worker has probability of observing the ad, 0 < < 1. One reason for < 1 could be that not all workers read the newspaper every day. As a result, the …rm is uncertain about the composition of the group of potential applicants. If a worker decides to apply, she incurs application cost C. 9 Following the results from the previous section, worker i's indirect utility function can be written as U ( i ; w), with properties U ( ) > 0 and U w ( ) > 0, and pro…ts of the …rm as ( i ; w), with properties ( ) > 0 and w ( ) < 0. Since condition (9) is always satis…ed in case of a …xed wage, the minimum wage o¤er a worker is willing to accept decreases in motivation. That is, if > 0 , then U ( ; w) = U ( 0 ; w 0 ) implies that w < w 0 .
Observable Motivation
Suppose the …rm can observe the level of intrinsic motivation of each applicant during the selection process. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The …rm posts a 'help-wanted'ad, in which it can credibly commit to a minimum wage.
2. The workers who observe the ad decide whether or not to apply. If a worker applies, she incurs cost C.
3. The …rm observes the types of all applicants, selects one applicant, and makes her a wage o¤er w.
4. The applicant accepts or rejects. Rejection results in zero pro…ts. 10 9 Instead of < 1, we could also assume that C is a random variable which di¤ers among workers. Important for the results is that the …rm faces some uncertainty about the composition of the group of applicants. 1 0 A more general set-up of the game would allow the …rm to make a wage o¤er to another applicant (or a better wage o¤er to the same worker) after a rejection. While this could reduce the probability to end up with an un…lled vacancy, it may increase the rents that have to be left to the hired worker. Workers may wait for a next (higher) wage o¤er at the risk that an other applicant accepts one of the …rm's next o¤ers. Allowing for multiple wage o¤ers will also a¤ect the decision to apply. We leave this for future research.
We …rst consider the case where the …rm has not committed to a minimum wage at stage 1. We solve the model by backward induction. The optimal strategy of each worker at stage 4 is simple: Accept if and only if U ( i ; w) U out . Application costs are sunk at this stage. As pro…ts increase in the worker's motivation, the …rm optimally selects the most motivated worker among the applicants. The optimal wage o¤er is such that U ( ; w) = U out . This strategy of the …rm at stage 3 makes that no worker applies at stage 2. Each worker anticipates that the …rm extracts all rents of her motivation, leaving the worker with the sunk application cost. 11 This result is known as the Diamond paradox (Diamond; see also Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999 ). 12 To give workers an incentive to apply, the …rm must make a credible commitment not to extract all rents from their motivation. It can do so by putting a minimum wage w min in the ad at stage 1. 13 If the minimum wage is su¢ ciently high, some worker types have positive expected bene…ts from applying. Since ( ) > 0, the …rm still selects the most motivated worker from the pool of applicants at stage 3. If the lowest wage that this worker would accept is below the minimum wage, the minimum wage is binding. Otherwise, the …rm o¤ers the wage that makes the worker indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. However, as above, these workers optimally do not apply. Hence, the …rm always o¤ers w min .
At stage 2, worker i applies if the expected bene…ts from applying are positive. Obviously, if a certain worker type has positive expected bene…ts from applying, all workers with higher motivation also have positive expected bene…ts from applying. A worker of type i applies if and only if:
where f ( i ) is the expected probability for a worker of type i of being selected by the …rm and U ( i ; w min ) is the utility that the worker obtains if she accepts o¤er w min . f ( i ) is determined by the distribution of worker types:
where N i is given by (11) . The …rst term is the probability that all workers with > i do not observe the ad. If any of these workers applies, then 1 1 The assumption that the …rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er implies that even if there is a single most motivated worker, n = 1, this worker can not capture any rents. 1 2 Note that if C = 0, all workers who observe the ad apply. The …rm selects the most motivated worker and o¤ers her the wage that exactly meets her participation constraint, as described in Section 3. 1 3 We assume that posting a range of wage o¤ers conditional on a worker's motivation is not credible, due to the unveri…ability of the level of motivation. Thus, posting a single wage is the best the …rm can do. worker i will not be selected by the …rm. The second term gives the probability that worker i is selected from all applicants of the same type. This probability is the function
; where x is the number of applicants with motivation i besides worker i, which follows a binomial distribution. The …rm sets the minimum wage such that expression (12) holds with equality for the least motivated worker type that it wants to apply. Denote this worker type by min . As argued above, if w min < w 0 min , then min > 0 min . Expected pro…ts are given by:
where
is the probability that is the highest level of motivation among the applicants, and ( ; w min ) is the accompanying level of pro…t. Suppose the …rm increases the minimum wage from w min to w 0 min such that min decreases by one worker type to 0 min . This leads to the following change in expected pro…ts:
which can be written as:
Increasing the minimum wage leads to a higher probability of …lling the vacancy, as an additional worker type, 0 min , has an incentive to apply after observing the ad. This is re ‡ected by the …rst term. However, if some worker with motivation higher than 0 min observes the vacancy, the increase in the minimum wage only leads to additional cost, as this worker would have applied at the lower minimum wage as well. This is described by the second term.
The …rm sets the minimum wage such that 0 min . A local optimum of E[ ( ; w min )] can be found by stepwise increasing the minimum wage until the sign of E[ ] turns negative. Whether there is only one local (and thus global) optimum is unsure given the general speci…cation of the distribution of worker types and of the pro…t function ( ; w min ). More speci…cally, if, for a value of w min above the local optimum, a small increase in w min results in a large increase in the probability of …lling the vacancy, then E[ ( ; w min )] may not be concave in w min , and, hence, there may be more than one local optimum. Restricting the distribution of worker types such that n = n for all and ( ; w 0 min ) ( ; w min ) is constant in w min (that is, the increase in w min necessary to attract one additional worker type is equal for all worker types), both terms of (16) decrease with w min . This implies that E[ ( ; w min )] is concave in w min and, hence, there exists only one local and global optimum. Corner solutions cannot be excluded: It is possible that the optimal min is either 0 or .
Unobservable Motivation
When the …rm can not observe the types of the applicants, it randomly selects one applicant and makes her a wage o¤er. As in the previous subsection, we assume that when the wage o¤er is rejected, the …rm ends up with zero pro…ts.
Consider …rst the case where the …rm has not committed to a minimum wage. The beliefs of the …rm about the distribution of applicants'types are crucial in determining the optimal wage o¤er. Suppose that the …rm believes that there exists some l such that only workers with i l apply after observing the vacancy. Let w l be the wage such that U ( l ; w l ) = U out . Given the …rm's beliefs, its optimal wage o¤er w is such that w w w l . Hence, workers of type l optimally decide not to apply as the wage o¤er does not compensate them for the application cost. This, in turn, reduces the …rm's optimal wage, which removes the incentives of workers with slightly higher motivation to apply. As this holds for any l (including ), the market collapses, as in Akerlof's lemon market. In Akerlof's model, the existence of bad types drives the good types out of the market. Interestingly, in our model, it is the withdrawal of the bad types from the market that drives out the good types.
Again, the …rm needs to commit to a minimum wage in order to attract applicants. In Appendix 3, we derive the optimal minimum wage when workers'motivation is unobservable. Compared to the case where motivation is observable, there is an additional selection e¤ect of raising the wage. As before, a higher minimum wage induces workers who are less motivated to apply. Hence, the average level of intrinsic motivation of applicants goes down. If the …rm can fully observe applicants' motivation, this reduction in average motivation of applicants does not entail a cost since the …rm simply chooses the best motivated worker among the applicants. However, if applicants' motivation is unobservable, the …rm picks an applicant randomly, and, hence, higher wages reduce the expected level of motivation of the worker that is hired. The selection e¤ect imposes an additional cost of increasing the minimum wage compared to the case where motivation is observable, and so the optimal minimum wage is lower. 14 
Motivation Can Be Signaled
Suppose that the …rm can not observe the motivation of the applicants, but applicants can credibly signal their type to the …rm. 15 Obviously, when the …rm does not commit to a minimum wage, none of the workers apply, as in the previous subsections. Each applicant anticipates that when she signals her type, the …rm fully extracts all the rents of motivation, leaving the applicant with the sunk application cost. Because no applicant reveals her type to the …rm, motivation remains unobservable. As we have seen in the previous subsection, this results in a complete breakdown of the market.
When the …rm posts a minimum wage w min , each applicant signals her motivation to the …rm. The intuition is that signaling increases a worker's probability of getting the job. Consider an applicant with motivation and suppose that all other applicants do not signal their motivation. If she signals, she is certain to get the job. If she does not signal, she only gets the job if she is randomly selected. Hence, she signals her type as signaling increases her probability of being selected by the …rm. This also holds when other workers signal. Next, consider workers of the highest but one type of motivation, h . Signaling is of no avail when a worker of type is in the pool of applicants. However, if none of the workers of type apply, signaling is bene…cial, as the …rm prefers to select a worker of type h if there are no workers of type available. Since workers have no information about the other applicants and signaling is costless, it is always in the interest of workers of type h to signal their type. Analogously, all applicants have an incentive to signal their type so as to increase the probability of getting the job.
It follows that a worker only gets the job if she is the most motivated applicant, as in Subsection 4.1 where the …rm could observe the motivation of the applicants. Hence, workers have the same incentives to apply as in Subsection 4.1, and the …rm optimally sets the minimum wage at the same level.
Signaling and Screening with Optimal Monetary Incentive Schemes
This section shows that the results derived in Section 4 under the assumption of a …xed wage generalise to the case where the …rm provides monetary incentives to the worker, as in Section 3.
wage, in order to reduce the number of relatively less motivated workers in the pool of applicants, as in Handy and Katz. Note also that a maximum wage is of no use when C > 0. Suppose the …rm wants that only workers with motivation apply. Analogous to the previous section, the …rm needs to commit to a minimum wage scheme in order to attract applicants, regardless of whether or not the …rm can observe the motivation of the applicants. The …rm has to commit to a minimum wage scheme that satis…es the following constraint: where p( ) is the probability of getting the job for a worker of type , given by (13) in case of observable motivation and by (A8) in case of unobservable motivation, respectively. Optimal e¤ort is again described by …rst-order conditions (4) and (5), with i = . Clearly, there exist many wage schemes that satisfy these conditions. One of these is depicted in Figure 2 . Figure 2 depicts the marginal product of e¤ort [q 0 (e)] and the marginal disutility from e¤ort for three di¤erent types of workers. The latter curves are obtained by rewriting the …rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort of the worker (4) to:
where i 2 fm; h; g, m < h < . Equation (17) describes for each level of e¤ort the minimum reward the …rm must provide to induce a worker of type i to provide an additional unit of e¤ort. Notice that when the …rm creates an incentive scheme which follows (17) exactly, the worker is just compensated for his (net) disutility from e¤ort. In order to give workers an incentive to apply, the …rm has to make sure that a worker with motivation min = ends up (in expected terms) with utility U out . Hence, the …rm must o¤er a base salary B min such that:
An optimal minimum wage scheme which induces only workers with motivation to apply thus consists of a base salary B min , given by (18) with min = , and a monetary incentive scheme which follows (17) up to the point where w 0 (e) = q 0 (e). Denote the accompanying level of e¤ort by e . The …rm's o¤er is:
This minimum wage o¤er is just su¢ cient to induce workers with motivation to apply. All other worker types have negative expected bene…ts from applying, and, hence, decide not to apply. Now suppose the …rm prefers to give the highest two types an incentive to apply, types and h . As in the previous section, this implies that the …rm has to leave a rent to workers of type . The …rm optimally trades o¤ the rents it has to leave in case the selected applicant appears to be a worker of type and the e¤ort exerted by a worker of type h . The pro…t maximising wage scheme which is acceptable to both types of workers is described by: where e h is the level of e¤ort a worker of type h is induced to exert by this pro…t maximising scheme, and P ( h ) and P ( ) are the probabilities that a worker of type h and a worker of type are hired, given by (15) when motivation is observable and by (A10) when motivation is unobservable, respectively. Base salary B h is implicitly given by (18) with min = h , and w h ( ) and w 0 ( ) are described by (17) with i = h ; , respectively. The …rst term in brackets is the …rm's pro…t in case a worker of type h is hired, which happens with probability P ( h ). In expected terms, the …rm does not leave a rent to these workers. The …rst derivative with respect to e h of this term is equal to zero when e h equals the optimal e¤ort level of workers of type h under full information, described in Section 3. The second term in brackets is the …rm's pro…t in case a worker of type is hired, which happens with probability P ( ). To meet this worker's individual rationality constraint, the …rm must provide monetary incentives as if the worker is of type h up to e¤ort level e h . Hence, the …rm leaves a rent to workers of type . Starting from e¤ort level e h , the …rm just compensates workers of type for each additional unit of e¤ort. The …rst derivative with respect to e h of the second term is always negative since w 0 h (e) > w 0 (e) for any e. Clearly, it is in the …rm's interest to set e h lower than the optimal e¤ort level under full information, which we derived in Section 3. The pro…t maximising wage scheme induces a worker of type h to exert suboptimally low e¤ort so as to reduce the rents which the …rm has to leave in case the o¤er is made to a worker of type . 16 Workers of type are induced to exert an e¢ cient level of e¤ort, as in Section 3. The …rm must, however, leave a rent to these workers. The optimal wage scheme which gives types and h an incentive to apply is described by:
Along the same lines, we can derive the optimal wage scheme when the …rm wants to induce more worker types to apply. The lower min , the higher the base salary and the higher the incentive wage up to e min must be in order to give workers with motivation min an incentive to apply. The wage scheme is such that each worker type -except -exerts a suboptimal level of e¤ort, so as to decrease the rents the …rm has to leave to higher types. As in Section 4, the optimal wage scheme entails a trade-o¤ between the probability of …lling the vacancy, the rents left to workers, and, if motivation is unobservable, the expected quality of the selected worker. It is straightforward to show that the …rm needs to commit to a su¢ ciently high base salary so as to attract applicants and to give them an incentive to signal their motivation.
Concluding remarks
This paper has studied a …rm's optimal recruitment, selection, and pay-forperformance practices when workers di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to work at the …rm. We have shown that, when intrinsic motivation can not be observed by the …rm, posting a higher wage may increase the probability of …lling a vacancy, but at the same time decrease the expected motivation of the hired worker. Screening technologies, like personality and workstyle tests, work trials, and the use of assessment centres, may help a …rm to select the best motivated worker among the applicants. But these may only help if the …rm commits to pay at least a certain wage. For otherwise, workers may have an incentive to conceal their motivation or, even worse, to abstain from applying.
Our model predicts that when workers'motivation is more easy to assess, workers'productivity and wages will be higher. Productivity is higher since the …rm is better able to select the best-motivated applicant. Wages will also be higher as there is less need to discourage low-motivated worker from applying by o¤ering a low wage. When workers'employment history contains some information on workers' motivation, older workers' motivation may be more easy to asses than younger workers'motivation. Adverse selection problems arising from heterogeneity in workers' motivation may therefore increase the wage premium on labour market experience. A testable implication of our model therefore is that in sectors where workers' intrinsic motivation is important, wage-experience pro…les are steeper.
Heterogeneity in workers' motivation may also a¤ect the e¤ects of intensifying competition in an industry. In a related paper, we extend our model to examine the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a monopsonistic …rm (Delfgaauw and Dur) . We show that …rms in a competitive market provide stronger monetary incentives to workers, pay higher wages, and employ less workers than a monopsonistic …rm. These …ndings square well with the empirical evidence on the e¤ects of privatisation and liberalisation.
We have adopted a very simple concept of workers'intrinsic motivation, namely that workers to a certain extent enjoy exerting e¤ort at work. We have assumed that this enjoyment of e¤ort is independent of the …rm's pay policies. Adopting a more sophisticated concept of intrinsic motivation may reveal interesting additional e¤ects to the ones we discussed above. For instance, a higher wage may change the public perception of how noble a task or job is, which in turn may reduce workers'motivation to do the job. Seabright (2002) and Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004) have recently developed models along these lines. Moreover, o¤ering pay-for-performance may undermine workers'intrinsic motivation as they feel that their intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged by the …rm (see Frey, 1997a, and Jegen, 2001) .
Hence, in line with …rst-order condition (5) , workers get their full marginal product, while the base salary B is such that the participation constraint of the worker is just satis…ed: U (w(e); e; e) = U (q(e) + B; e; e) = U out (A2)
By combining the optimal wage scheme (A1) and the …rst-order conditions for e¤ort (4) and pro…t (5) , it follows that the optimal level of e¤ort is implicitly given by:
In Section 3, we derived the e¤ect of a marginal change in on the optimal level of e¤ort:
where @F=@e < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker's optimisation problem (A3). We are interested in the sign of dw(e) d . By using (A1), we can rewrite this to:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of this equation is simply:
where de d is given by (A4). The second term on the right-hand side of (A5) can be found by using the participation constraint (A2) and applying the implicit function theorem:
where the term in square brackets is zero by …rst-order condition (A3) (the envelop theorem). Hence, we can rewrite (A5) as:
where the second equality follows from (A3). Total wage compensation thus decreases in motivation if the following condition holds:
which is identical to condition (9) in the main text.
B Appendix 2
Suppose the wage results from a bargain between the …rm and the worker, of which the outcome is described by the generalised Nash bargaining function. The worker's bargaining power is denoted by , the …rm has bargaining power 1 (0 1). Note that apart from the total compensation to the worker, the incentive scheme derived in Section 3 is optimal for both the …rm and the worker. Denote the minimum wage for which the worker is willing to work by w min ( ). The maximum wage the …rm is willing to o¤er is denoted by w max ( ). The wage that results from the bargaining is the minimum wage plus a proportion of the total rents (the di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum wage):
To examine the e¤ect of on w, we di¤erentiate this function with respect to : dw d = w 0 max ( ) + (1 )w 0 min ( )
In Section 3 we have shown that w 0 max ( ) > 0 and w 0 min ( ) < 0, provided that condition (9) holds. The wage decreases in motivation if:
max ( ) Hence, as long as is su¢ ciently low, the wage decreases in the motivation of the worker.
C Appendix 3
Suppose the …rm puts minimum wage w min in its ad. 17 When motivation is unobservable a worker of type i applies if and only if:
where g( i ) is the expected probability for a worker with motivation i of being randomly selected by the …rm after applying. This probability is
where v is the number of applicants besides worker i. v is a random variable which follows a binomial distribution. It is easily veri…ed that:
The …rm sets the minimum wage such that expression (A7) holds with equality for the least motivated worker type, min , that it wants to apply. Expected pro…ts of the …rm are given by:
where G( ) is the probability that the …rm selects an applicant with motivation . This probability is S S + Z , where S is the number of applicants of type and Z the number of applicants with a di¤erent type of motivation. Both S and Z follow a binomial distribution, and their joint distribution is given by: observes the ad. Note that P min G( ) < 1, as there may be no applicant at all, which happens with probability (1 ) N min . Suppose the …rm increases the minimum wage from w min to w 0 min , such that min decreases by one worker type to 0 min . This reduces the probability of selecting an applicant with motivation to: ]. Intuitively, the probability that a worker of a certain type is selected decreases if the number of worker types that apply increases. This is the selection e¤ect. As before, the increase in the minimum wage decreases the probability that nobody applies, as P 0 min G 0 ( ) > P min G( ). The increase in the minimum wage from w min to w 0 min leads to the following change in expected pro…ts: which can be rewritten as:
E[ ] = G 0 ( 0 min ) ( 0 min ; w 0 min )+ X min G 0 ( ) ( ; w 0 min ) G( ) ( ; w min ) (A12) The …rst term gives the probability of selecting a worker with motivation 0 min and the accompanying pro…ts. The second term indicates that by increasing w min to w 0 min , each worker type min has a lower probability of being selected, and, given a selected worker type, the pro…t of the …rm is lower as a result of the wage increase. This expression is negative, since G 0 ( ) < G( ) for all 2 [ min ; ] and ( ; w 0 min ) < ( ; w min ). As in Subsecion 4.2, the optimal minimum wage is found by stepwise increasing the minimum wage until the sign of E[ ] turns negative. See the last paragraph of Subsection 4.2.
